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This year marks the 50th anniversary of the publication of the
complete Systematic Theology, a massive attempt to present in a
rational fashion the core of Christian beliefs, myths, and rites in a
manner that speaks to its time—a time of profound unbelief and
anxiety. As theologian, Tillich feels no lack of warrant, for theology
speaks only of things that are of ultimate concern to humans, things
that unavoidably interest us because they are a matter of our very
being or nonbeing (ST I, 14, 16). Our experience of being in modern
times is one of anxiety, a perceived background of meaninglessness
that drives us into collectivism or conformism, or individualism, or
despair and deprives us of authentic forms of courage—or the ability to
confront our finitude, the wormhole of nonbeing in the ontological
apple. “Anxiety is finitude, experienced as one’s own finitude” (CB 35).
What is Christian in Tillich’s theology is its tie to historical Christianity
and to the normative expression of early Christians that in Jesus God
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manifested the Logos or messiah. But that is not our concern here,
except to remark on Tillich’s intellectual honesty: he is an exquisite
practitioner of the history of ideas, at once able to encompass whole
eras in generalizations that are apt and to epitomize individual thinkers
with remarkable brevity. Our concern in this paper is to elucidate how
Tillich makes religion a matter of ontology, and how, from the very
first, he follows Schelling’s model of ontological questioning—which I
will here call the double-helix, or the twisted structure of being and
nonbeing such that reality is unable to be in any other way than
dynamic.
In the first section of this paper I shall briefly discuss Tillich
early Schelling studies and then turn to Schelling’s own texts to show
that Tillich interpretation is correct. The major part of the paper will be
devoted to showing how Schelling’s concepts form the structural
backbone of Systematic Theology as well as the more accessible
Courage to Be lectures where Tillich argues that the only form of
credible religious belief is an absolute one where Christianity criticizes
its concrete symbols and embraces a God beyond theism (CB 188-89).
While the language of the lectures is more daring, its content is no
more disquieting to the professional theologian than the picture
presented in the final volume of Systematic Theology of the ambiguous
presence of the Spirit in a spiritual community that across history may
or may not dwell in those ecclesial structures that call themselves
Christ’s church. The ‘unambiguous life’ that is sheltered by spiritual
community is fragmentary and anticipatory at best, but without
specific religious teachings, symbols or acts (ST 3, 157-58). Tillich’s
religion, like Schelling’s, is ontological, not ecclesial.

I.
Tillich’s knowledge of Schelling is deep and sympathetic from
the very first. In his philosophical dissertation of 1910, The
Construction of the History of Religion in Schelling’s Positive
Philosophy, the young Tillich attempts a sweeping interpretation of
Schelling’s long journey to the philosophical religion of the late
writings, but gravitates toward the philosophy of freedom of the 1809
Philosophical Investigations. The essence of human consciousness is
God-positing, or intellectual intuition of the identity between finite and
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absolute consciousness (CHR 122), but at the same time it is
estranged from its God-positing substantiality. Tillich agrees with
Schelling that essence of the religious picture is that “the formulation
of a concept of religion must necessarily include a relationship between
God and man that presupposes a definite division between them”
(ibid., 124). The tension between identity and action in the human
spirit that is the driving motive in Schelling’s early philosophical
development becomes in the 1809 essay a historical process, a path of
development in which the rest of intellectual intuition is sundered
when the subject becomes agent. Finite consciousness posits itself as
fallen from the identity of its original God positing, but not as the
natural religion of Enlightenment times might picture it, in
independence from a rational world-architect and serenely possessing
as its own its limited faculties of reason, imagination, and will. That
human consciousness is God-positing and at the same time selfseparated from the divine is the core of Tillich’s view of human reality
(ibid., 125-27). There is a struggle at the core of the religious
relationship, which in its most explicit form is the guilt-accepting
acceptance of unacceptability, viewed in The Courage to Be as Martin
Luther’s personal or existential experience of Christian grace. In that
experience, God is comprehends as the ontological Yes that includes
its No, and blessedness is experienced as both bliss and the nameless
anxiety it conquers (CB 170-71, 180).
Tillich’s 1912 theological dissertation, Mysticism and Guiltconsciousness in Schelling’s Philosophical Development, identifies the
core of all of Schelling’s thought in the tension between the identity of
God and the finite and the ‘fall’ (self-separation) of the later—or the
otherness of existence, signified by the failure of the ontological proof
(MG 35). While one might want to calculate the period of Schelling’s
philosophical development in terms of the influence of other
philosophers, so that besides the philosophy of nature there are
periods where Plato, Spinoza, Boehme, Baader, Hegel, and finally
Aristotle provide inspiration, there is really only one thematic thread at
work throughout: the identity principle and its relation to moral
categories such as separation, fall, and freedom. Tillich prefers the
clarity of the 1809 Philosophical Investigations to the detail of the
positive philosophy (ibid. 22-25). The discussion of Schelling’s text
that he offers is quite condensed and cryptic. The early Fichtean
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works, the essays in Naturphilosophie and the aesthetics of genius that
crown the System of Transcendental Idealism are all read as variants
of identity theory: ethical mysticism, nature mysticism, aesthetic
mysticism (ibid., 45-68). Philosophy and Religion marks a turn toward
history, and with the teaching of the self-separation or fall of the ideas
into finite existence the mysticism of intellectual intuition is put at risk.
Tillich’s exegesis of the freedom essay is quite dense and free-form:
contradiction and self-will are read as ‘sin’ and ‘guilt’, and the cosmic
process of separation of good and evil read as triumph of ‘grace’ over
‘death and wrath’ (ibid., 108-112). But in phrases such as “the identity
of sin and grace” Tillich thinks in solidarity with Schelling that evil and
the self-will that is its origin remains even in the cosmic resolution.
Guilt has its ground in ontology, as Tillich major works assert, and is
no more a psychological quirk than the background radiation of
anxiety that its horizon and cradle.

II.
Tillich’s theology follows Schelling’s philosophy in its insistence
that religious questions are ontological ones, that ontology is a
dynamic domain—and not an overview of an assemblage of things
manufactured or arbitrarily brought together. The logos of being
follows from the question, first posed by Leibniz, Why is there is
something and not nothing? In its first and highest instance, being is
self-realizing, that it includes and comprehends the possibility of
nonbeing: that it stands out from nonbeing.
Tillich opens Systematic Theology with an essay on reason and
revelation. In its asking of the first and ultimate questions, reason is
driven beyond itself to ‘mystery’, the ground and abyss that precedes
reason. It is of ultimate concern for us because it is about the ground
of our being, and it is ‘ecstatic’ because it reaches beyond the subjectobject structure for that which is primal. And it involves, says Tillich,
“ontological” or metaphysical shock in that it involves: Why not
nothing? and with that the realization that I or anybody might not be
here to ask the question (ST 1, 110-113). There is something
disquieting about the answers such a question can receive, for they
are irretrievably symbolic or metaphorical; if one says “the divine life
is a dynamic unity of depth and form,” and goes on to explain that by
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”depth” one means the abysmal character of God, the ineffability and
inexhaustibility of being itself, by ‘form” one means word, logic or
structure, and by “dynamic unity” a process of unforeseeable
communication or unfolding, it is obvious that these are not logical or
personal categories (ST 1, 156, cp. 115). Tillich takes both this
ontological starting point and the terms for describing the threedimensional life of God from Schelling.
First, let us look to the theme of Schelling’s concept of ontology.
When Schelling publically inaugurated the Positive Philosophy in
1841/42 with the Berlin Lectures on the Philosophy of Revelation,
insisting that the difference between concept and existence (or
possibility and actuality) was unbridgeable, that the finite being of the
potencies followed from the unforeseeable existence of the absolute
Prius, he deepened and refined two earlier veins of ontological
exploration (PO 160-64). The first to be explored (in the writings of
1795-1801) was the relatively simple concept of God or the absolute
as self-existent. The second (explored in the writings of 1801-1815)
was the concept of God or the absolute as free over against being, or
having an actuality that somehow dialectically combined being and
nonbeing, or envisioned existence as involving a power that asserted
being over nonbeing. The first line of thought yields a pure essence,
the concept of necessary existence whose ontological status is
necessary but contingent—a necessary existent, if it exists. The actus
purus of the second line of thought makes the divine being
contingently necessary, relative to the possibility for other-being that it
established (ibid., 165-171). In a third aspect, the positive philosophy
stipulates that God is spirit or freedom over against primordial being
and realized possibility, the evolution of that which ought to be (ibid.,
172-76). The complicated line of thought developed here
fundamentally pits the concept of necessary existence against freedom
to be or not to be.
Schelling had always demonstrated a fondness for the
ontological proof, though he was as skeptical as Kant about whether it
‘worked’. In 1795, he argued that in the realm of proof, we are always
dealing with conditions; the divine being, however, ought to be a
matter of rational analysis. And when we ascribe being to the absolute,
we ought not confuse being with contingent existence or actuality (SW
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I, 308, 308n). In 1802, Schelling uses the analog of the ontological
proof to explain the certainty of intellectual intuition; from the very
idea of an absolute cognition that one has, one can infer the reality of
an absolute wherein form and being are the same. What is deficient in
the so-called proof is its picturing its object as somehow subsisting
outside of its cognizing and being-cognized (SW 4, 363-68). In 1804
Schelling repeats and amplifies this argument, moving from the selfintuition of reason in intellectual intuition to the conclusion that what is
realized in reason is the idea of God. The idea of God is self-realizing in
reason—the form of cognition that is self-identical and beyond the
difference of discursive knowing (SW 6, 150-54). The idea of God,
which is self-enjoyed in intellectual intuition, illuminates the ‘why’ of
God’s being, i.e., it is modally necessary, not factual, and so forever
beyond the reach of nonbeing. Nothing or utter nonbeing is impossible.
Says Schelling:
The absolute light: the idea of God, strikes reason like a flash of
lightning, so to speak, and its luminosity endures in reason as
an eternal affirmation of knowledge. By virtue of this
affirmation, which is the essence of our soul, we recognize the
eternal impossibility of nonbeing that can never be known or
comprehended; and that ultimate question posed by the
vertiginous intellect hovering at the abyss of the infinite: ‘Why is
there something rather than nothing?, this question will be
swept aside forever by the necessity of being, that is, by the
absolute affirmation of being in knowledge (ibid., 155).
For Tillich’s purposes, though not ultimately for Schelling, this
dynamic being that incorporates and excludes nonbeing suffices to get
the project of systematic theology underway. God is the affirmation of
being, and if being is, as Spinoza realized, as power or the selfexpression of what is essential, the human finds her essential being
expressed in the religious relationship. Another way to say this is to
say that because the divine-human relationship is at the core of the
human being, her fundamental problem (finitude) and her awareness
of it (anxiety) all pertain to that relationship to too (CB 24-28). If
modern man experiences life as precarious and his self-awareness is
anxiety, anxiety is a religious experience.
Tillich chooses to follow Schelling in calling the primordial or
ontological aspect of God “the Abyss.” It is the ground of reality,
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human and natural; it is ineffable or inconceivable, self-enclosed and
manifests itself only as power of resisting nonbeing. The only thing
literal or nonsymbolic that one can say of God is that it is being itself,
neither a being nor the totality of being. Various theologies have tried
to apply categories of relation to the God-human relationship, but it is
symbolic or non-literal speech if we speak of God as the creator or
immanent cause, or find that things inhere in God (ST1, 236-38). All
ontological speech is symbolic or analogous—except to say that
something is and cannot not be. Ever careful with his words, Tillich
notes that “it is as atheistic to affirm the existence of God as to deny
it. God is being itself, not a being” (ibid., 237). About symbolic speech,
he thinks a symbol speaks ‘truly’ if it reveals something or speaks to
somebody. But the history of religions is filled with dead symbols, or
ways of speaking of the finite-infinite relation that fail to reflect light in
both directions.
Tillich adopts a mode of trinitarian thinking from Schelling that
is ontological, prior to any discussion of Christian doctrine of the
Trinity. Human intuition has always distinguished the element of power
in the divine from the element of meaning, the logos or word, and
then gone on to distinguish a third principle of communication or
expression whereby the finite and the infinite are united, spirit (ST 1,
250-251). Schelling displays this trinitarian way of thinking as early as
the Bruno, where the three potencies of identity theory are rescued
from the dry Spinozism of Presentation of My System and put into
Neoplatonic and mythic guise, wherein the finite individuals in their
apostasy from their organic life in the Ideas are seem to be products
of self-will or self-temporization (SW 4: 283-84). The identity of all or
the eternal potency is compared to the Father, the infinite or ideal
potencies to the Spirit which unifies, while the finite is by its own will
made subject to time and suffering (ibid., 252). Trinitarian thinking is
found in the Philosophical Investigations as well, with one of the triadic
structures (nature, man, and a personal God) used to secure the
philosophical account of the possibility of evil (PI 62-63) and another
(Ungrund, nature and spirit) used to explain the dynamics of
development (ibid., 69-70).
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III.
Let us turn to a closer look at Tillich’s theology. Generally we
will look to the text of Systematic Theology for discussions of
theological and philosophical method. The contemporary look back at
the interface of religious and other cultural institutions cannot help but
be historical---and critical. For insight into Tillich’s thought about the
current state of Christian theology and the possibility of its relevance
to the human situation in the age of anxiety, when much of Christian
writings, rites and morality are seen to be worn out and lacking in the
power to guide, we look to the more homiletic Courage to Be lectures.
Systematic theology operates by what Tillich calls the “the
method of correlation.” Questions that are philosophical, or really
anthropological, receive theological answers, for religion functions as
one of the chief repositories of answers about existence that the
question-posing animal requires. “Man is the question he asks about
himself, before any question has been formulated” (ST I, 62). The
method of correlation explains the content of the Christian faith
through the interdependence of existential questions and theological
answers (ibid., 60-61}. A coherentist epistemology is at work here. No
inherently true human experiences, miraculous sightings or inerrant
writings can be found to validate or invalidate a religious worldview—
something that is essentially philosophical (or undecidable)!
“Revelation does not destroy reason, but reason raises the question of
revelation” (ibid., 81).
The Schelling of the 1809 Philosophical Investigations shares
with both his major 20th century disciples, Heidegger and Tillich, the
conviction that questions about God and world occur in humankind
because man is the site of both questioning and self-awareness.
Whether or not such questions are answerable, or resolvable through
analysis or action, questioning is the human activity par excellence.
Tillich remains optimistic about the availability of answers: “Man is
able to answer the ontological question himself because he
experiences directly and immediate the structure of being and its
elements” (ST I, 169). As embodied finite reason, the human
experiences being as limited power, existence as self-contradictory,
and the life process itself as ambiguous (ibid., 81). But as subject or
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self-aware, the human directly experiences being, existence and life
and so has a pre-reflective experience of those dimensions of the
divine that Christian revelation speaks of as the ground of being, the
possibility of new existence, and the life of Spirit. When the abysmal
ground manifests the logos, existence is seen to be not essentially
guilt but ‘new being’, and the social and historical dimension of life,
with all of its promise and frailty, is seen to bear the seeds of
‘unambiguous life’ (See ST II, 176-77; III, 401-402, 420-422).
In its first appearance, says Tillich, the ontological question
considers the one who poses the question: self and world are
presumed, tied together in subject-object structure. Secondly, the
question concern the “elements” that make up the structure of being,
thirdly the difference between essential being and existence, and
fourth, the categories of being and knowing (ST I, 164). It is the
second category that offers the richest field for comment, the vaguely
named ontological elements, which come in three pairs:
Individuality – Universality
Dynamics – Form
Freedom – Destiny
All three concern human agency and its environment. The first
pair considers the individual or person as the unit of human reality.
Though singular in number, by possessing mind, the singular human is
connected to others physically and temporally remote. ‘Communion’ or
community is participation in one or more similarly individuated and
self-centered selves, and is essential to the life of the individual (ibid.,
176). Quantification across this dimension yields an important
measure of how persons experience themselves and their world,
individualism vis-à-vis collectivism. Courage to Be uses this measure
to distinguish not only political styles of existence, e.g., liberalism visà-vis totalitarianism, but to contrast styles of Christian conscience,
e.g., Protestant individualism and Catholic or medieval quasicollectivism (CB 101-117). Tillich avoids the stereotypical contrast
between Protestantism’s freedom of conscience and Catholic
authoritarianism, for factors other than religion and individual choice
lessen the contrast between individualism and collectivism.
Participating in economic production, for example, enforces a quotidian
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conformism in ‘free’ societies which makes daily life similar to that in
centrally planned economies. The second pair is somewhat oddly
named, for ‘dynamics’ indicates that which is unformed, but endowed
with potential, or something relatively irrational in contrast to precise
rationality. The tension between dynamics and form indicates a
creative way of simultaneously conserving and transcending oneself,
or of preserving oneself while transforming self and environing
conditions—like the equilibrium of a physical system or the
homeostasis of an organism (ST I, 174-76). Finally, the tension
between freedom and destiny indicate the nature of a situated act by a
free agent, one that necessarily takes place in a physical context and
in a definite matrix of possibilities. “Freedom is experienced as
deliberation, decision, and responsibility” (ibid., 184). That my act is
situated means that destiny informs my freedom; that I have to weigh
values and choose among competing alternatives means that my
freedom participates in shaping my destiny.
These three vaguely named structures of being together state
the parameters of human existence that an individual person enacts—
social, biological and mental conditions of finite human freedom. While
they give Tillich the tools for much of the critical or destructive work of
Systematic Theology-- which is an encyclopedic review of the major
epistemological, scientific, philosophical, political, psychological, social
and religious ideas of our civilization-- they also give him the
categories for positively elaborating the Christian ethic that is found in
the Courage to Be lectures.
The ontological situation for the post-modern human is
continuous anxiety, accompanied by a pervasive guilt. Anxiety is
object-less fear, fear that persists when fear is the only thing to fear.
Guilt is the appropriate response. In earlier times, Western man
required pictures and stories of places of punishment and torture by
fantastic beasts and malevolent beings. Now the most ordinary human
beings in the most secure places imagine themselves objects of
surveillance; everyman is Kafka’s Joseph K.—or Edward Snowden. The
human response is courage, ontological rather than soldierly courage,
and the various styles of human existence—individualism, conformism,
and collectivism—determine corresponding styles of courage to be.

Futures of Schelling: The Second Conference of the North American Schelling Society, (2013). Unpublished paper. This
article is © Society for Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy and permission has been granted for this version to
appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Society for Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy does not grant permission
for this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from Society for
Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy.

10

NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page.

Anxiety is an ontological malady, the awareness of our own
finitude or of the fact that we carry nonbeing in our very ontic selfexpression. There is anxiety in every fear, and vice versa. The fear of
death lurks behind the fear in every anxiety, but close inspection
reveals that the human is anxious about being itself. “The basic
anxiety, the anxiety of a finite being about the threat of nonbeing,
cannot be eliminated. It belongs to being itself” (CB 39). Tillich
elaborates three styles or potencies of anxiety: 1) the anxiety of
unpredictability (fate) and death, 2) the anxiety of emptiness and
meaninglessness, and 3) and the anxiety of despair. Uncertainty and
lack of control prefigure death, the poverty of the outcome of one’s
work portends meaninglessness, but the upshot of all our acts, from
their moral foundations to their spiritual satisfaction, seems to crumble
into dust and leave only a vague residue of guilt. Everything in human
life points to despair, except for the multitude of petty distractions and
evasions which for the most part keep us comfortably numb (ibid., 4056).
In response to this map of the labyrinth of despair, Tillich offers
a slim thread twisted from the various of courageous response. The
basic alternatives are to rely upon oneself or to take refuge in the
collective: self-reliance undergirds the romantic, naturalistic, and
demonic forms of individualism seen in recent cultural history, and
paves the way for the lonely encounter of the resolute person in
absolute anxiety (ibid., 148-49). The other, collectivistic, alternative
chooses the path of participation and becomes mysticism. The mystic
is willing to turn ontology inside out and so finds rest in that doubt is
turned against finite being and negates it, since everything that
appears is deceptive and illusory. “Nonbeing is no threat because finite
being is, in the last analysis, nonbeing. . . . The anxiety of
meaninglessness is conquered where the ultimate meaning is not
something definite but the abyss of every definite meaning” (ibid.,
158-59). Tillich has limited confidence in the mystic solution, although
every individualistic kind of ontological courage involves an element of
trusting in the abyss, or the power of being to overcome nonbeing.
Since religion gives answers to questions that philosophy poses,
it must be the elemental character of the human situation in which the
definitive answer to anxiety can be found. So Tillich looks again to the
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individual-or-participant structure of the person’s selfhood and finds
that in the middle between mystic absorption into the ground and
personal encounter with a so-called ‘divine person’ one finds faith (CB
156-57). Absolute faith—perhaps naked faith might be the better
term—does not deny or transcend meaninglessness as mysticism does,
but embraces it, at least within a skeptical moment of its action. The
skeptical element cuts against the subject-object structure of personal
encounter, so that, it seems that the modern existentialist hero
encounters nothing but meaninglessness in its purest or grittiest form
(ibid., 177-78). It almost goes without saying that the skeptical
element, so exercised, will also sweep away almost all the forms,
formulas, and rituals of prior versions of Christianity. Though Tillich
speaks more reticently (or professionally) in Systematic Theology,
there is little asserted in its third volume about the Spirit, the
community and the ‘kingdom of God’ in history that is edifying or
consoling. The presence of the Spirit in a spiritual community that may
or may not have much to do with the churches and their muddled
histories is everywhere ambiguous, even if Spirit is defined as
‘unambiguous life’ (ST 3, 183 ff). As representing the kingdom of God
and embodying the spiritual community, the churches both reveal and
hide (ibid., 375).
Absolute faith is empty faith, or to say the same thing,
ontological faith—trusting in the power of being--which always has to
be glossed as the expansion or assertion of being over the contraction
of nonbeing. Nonbeing is the element in being which forces, which by
enclosing its power within limits, forces it to be beyond itself and to
open itself as power and love. Speaking in almost as oracular as
fashion as Schelling does in the Philosophical Investigations, Tillich
states:
Nonbeing (that in God which makes his self-affirmation
dynamic) opens up the divine self-seclusion and reveals him as
power and love. Nonbeing makes God a living God. Without the
No he has to overcome in himself and in his creatures, the
divine Yes to himself would be lifeless. There would be no
revelation of the ground of being, there would be no life (CB
180).
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What of the ‘believer’ (or absolute skeptic, rather) in the
situation of absolute faith? The horizon of meaningless is not
expunged, guilt is not assuaged, and there is no Kantian court of
reason to indict or to acquit. One finds, like the anguished Luther, that
one is accepted trotz one’s unacceptability. At the boundary between
being and nonbeing, and far beyond all forms of theism which ever
and again forget the ontological difference and that figure the divine as
a being, absolute faith fears no judgment and asks no forgiveness
(ibid., 189-90). This is the paradox of Christianity, says Tillich: not
irrational, not absurd, and nor reflectively or dialectically rational. The
‘paradox’ is a new reality and not a logical riddle (ST II, 91).
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